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 Abstract 
This paper focuses in an explanation of Prinz’s moral proposal in the book The Emotional Construction of 
Morals, specific in the role that emotions and sentiments play in his system. The first part relates to the 
presentation and explanation of his two main theses, namely, a metaphysical and an epistemic approach 
of morality. A good understanding of the main concepts worked by the author may shine a light in what 
he understands as morality, providing a better view of how and when he turns away from naturalism, 
despite of the large number of empirical studies that he presents in his book. The result of this paper will 
be a better understanding of the position he defends and how his approach is a deception in terms of a 
naturalistic view of morality, arguing that his theses are, at the end, an empirically disguised 
culturalism. 
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 Resumo 
Este artigo foca numa explicação da proposta moral de Prinz no livro The Emotional Construction of 
Morals, especificamente no papel que emoções e sentimentos desempenham no seu sistema. A primeira 
parte é relativa a apresentação e explicação de sua duas teses principais, a saber, uma aproximação 
metafísica e uma epistêmica da moralidade. Uma boa compreensão dos principais conceitos trabalhados 
pelo autor poderá trazer luz sobre o que ele entende como moralidade, provendo uma visão melhor 
sobre como e quando ele se afasta do naturalismo, apesar do grande número de estudos empíricos que 
ele apresenta em seu livro. O resultado desse artigo será uma melhor compreensão da posição que ele 
defende e como sua aproximação é enganosa em termos de uma visão naturalista da moralidade, 
argumentando que sua tese é, no fim, um culturalismo empiricamente disfarçado. 
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Jesse Prinz’s book The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007) is the third in trilogy 
paralleling the structure of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. The first one was Furnishing the 
Mind (2002), followed by Gut Reactions (2004), where he presents empiricist theories of concepts 
and emotions. His approach of morality follows the same argumentative structure present in 
his previews work, namely, drawing on the best available evidence provided by psychology 
and anthropology in order to support a philosophical thesis. This makes his sentimentalist 
theory of morality quite interesting for an analysis, since he tries to establish a relation between 
empirical data and the traditional problem of the foundation of moral judgments. Few moral 
philosophers seek to ground their approach of such questions in neighbor disciplines, which 
make his work quite unusual in its philosophical scope and depth. 
Drawing on his previous work, the author seek to sustain an emotionism built upon a 
non-cognitive theory of morality based on emotions, in order to establish the priority of these 
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latter over any other moral judgment. In his embodied appraisal theory (2002; 2004), emotions 
are conceived as somatic signals representing concerns about the world. In this sense, they are 
representations functionally grouped in calibration files by their capacity to cause certain 
somatic signals. To put shortly, there would be a few number of these kinds of signals that 
would produce different emotions, either by changes or combination in the calibration files that 
activates them. 
In what concerns of this line of thought, Prinz’s work is original in terms that he is 
bridging several gaps between different scientific communities that should interact more with 
each other. However, Prinz’s end up with a point of view that goes against a naturalistic 
explanation of morality and, therefore, against the very own data that he uses to sustain his 
theory. It is impossible to cover all the ground discussed in Prinz's book in a short article, but let 
me at least highlight the main theses defended in the book in order to show how he is more a 
culturalist than a naturalist. 
 
1. Introducing Emotionism 
The emotionist theory of morality defended by Prinz has two main theses. The first is a 
metaphysical one, where an action has the property of being morally wrong or right in case it 
causes feelings of disapprobation or approbation in regular observers under certain conditions. 
Here Prinz argues that moral properties, in the way they are expressed in ordinary moral 
concepts, are impossible for us to grasp without our ability to experience emotions. Ultimately 
these sorts of reactions are the only base to unify moral properties for lack of any other 
distinctive feature. This leads us to his epistemic theses, where this kind of disposition is view 
as a possession condition of the standard concept of wrong or right. His argument goes here in 
the direction of the impossibility for those who lack emotions, such as psychopaths, to have 
moral concepts. 
The emotionism sustains that moral emotions are those triggered by the detection of a 
behavior that conforms or violates a social rule. According to Prinz (2007, p. 29), “having a 
moral attitude is a matter of having an emotional disposition”. However, he makes a distinction 
between reactive moral emotions, such as anger, contempt or disgust for a person transgressing 
a norm, from the reflexive moral emotions, related here to the varieties of shame and guilt one 
may experience when himself are the transgressor. These sorts of emotions are context-sensitive 
occurrent manifestations related to a long-term memory disposition that Prinz call moral 
sentiments. Notice that they may vary across different social contexts, but are not relative inside 
these contexts. 
Prinz’s approach constitutes some sort of phenomenology of moral emotions that he 
tries to relate with psychological and anthropological experiments. He associates this form of 
emotionism with sensibility theories, such as the ones defended by most of the British moralists 
of the eighteenth century. For the author, the epistemology of his theory should be understood 
in a particular non-mandatory way. Accordingly, in order to competently taken a moral 
concept, the individual must have, or have had, some sort of emotional episode, or at least be 
disposed to have that emotion. In fact, Prinz (2007, p. 16) states that “moral concepts [...] are 
constituted by emotions”. The question that remains here is about the necessity of an individual 
be able to recognize concepts in order to be able to have moral sentiments and how he does that 
in the non-cognitive way that Prinz seek to defend. A look into Prinz’s sentimentalist theory 
may share some light on that. 
 
1.1 Prinz’s sentimentalist theory 
In his epistemic theses, Prinz defines ordinary moral concepts as detectors of the properties of 
rightness or wrongness existing in a socio-cultural environment. These detectors comprise a 
                              Controvérsia, São Leopoldo, v. 12, n. 3, p. 188-192, set.-dez. 2016.         190 
sentiment that disposes an individual to feel emotions in the approbation or disapprobation 
range. Moral judgments have they foundation in concepts of this kind, been equated with 
sentiments that elicit emotions in a person. Prinz (2007, p.36) mentions the Trolley Problems as a 
case that purports to show that “when people attribute emotions, they also experience them”. 
Although the articulation of this sort of judgment can be inferential, their ultimate grounding 
norm resides in a social sentiment accessed by ones emotions. “The standard concept WRONG 
is a detector for the property of wrongness that comprises a sentiment that disposes its 
possessor to experience emotions in the disapprobation range” (Prinz, 2007, p.94). 
Prinz’s explanation of moral rightness and wrongness has a formulation that fit a 
standard format. For example, an action A has the moral property M, just in case of A causes in 
subject S a response of the type R under circumstances C. The author seeks to withdraw all the 
references to variable C, establishing S’s response to R a sentiment, understood here as a 
dispositional property, which already have circumstances of manifestation built into it. In other 
words, the sentiment S is going to be the disposition to experience F under circumstances C. 
Prinz base this structure in evidences from experimental psychology that presents observations 
of people mention emotional episodes as justification for their judgments about moral norms, 
such as the harm that violations cause. 
Prinz’s sentimentalist theory ends up being a new version of this kind of sensibility 
approach about morality, but taking the moral properties as having a response-dependent 
nature. The main cost of his theses is an exterior-relativism, since that the sentiments to which 
emotions are directed can be different if we consider the existence of a huge variety of social 
environments. He accepts that, but argues in favor of an internal-realism about moral 
properties. Prinz (2007, p. 168) claim that “they are made by our sentiments, and, once made, 
they can be perceived”. This form of sentimentalism promotes a relative-relativism, where 
context contributes towards the determination of the content of moral judgments. However, it is 
not relative inside the social environment, when ones emotions could be consider right or 
wrong in relation to the sentiment that prevails in the society in which he lives. Prinz’s 
constructive sentimentalist theses explain how these social sentiments emerge and develop, but 
the explanation is based on culture construction and not in evolutionism. 
I do not deny that morality is ecumenical, but I think it is not innate – at least that the 
current state of evidence is unpersuasive. Morality, like all human capacities, depends on 
having particular biological predispositions, but none of these, I submit, deserves to be 
called a moral faculty. Morality is a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that 
evolved for other purposes (Prinz, 2008, p. 01). 
 
Considering that the social-relativist aspect of his theory might give room for the 
justification of totalitarian governments, he seeks some kind of objective genealogy of moral 
values. He grounded this on an edifying discourse that sustain a moral progress based on the 
relation between knowledge and moral improvement, contradicting the non-cognitive approach 
he look for it in the beginning of his book. The argument goes in favor of the discourse that 
knowledge promotes a healthy tolerance, improving our social conditions. In other words, the 
biological foundation of the social behavior would not yield morality without cultural 
elaboration. Prinz’s end up putting the foundation and origin of morality in artificially 
constructed bases, putting aside a naturalistic thesis in favor of a more conventional 
culturalism. 
 
2. Deconstructing Prinz’s naturalism 
Prinz’s construction of a moral theory based on emotions brings a strong relativism, namely, the 
idea that moral properties are culturally relative. He points out, however, that the sentiments 
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presented within these social environments may actually converge, being directly related to the 
artificial aspects of cultural education. For the author, only social relations establish inside a 
culture can develop sentiments, which are recognized and accessed by the emotions presents in 
any individual, functioning as guides to determine the righteousness and wrongness of an 
action. According to Prinz (2008, p. 28), “religion, like morality, appears everywhere, but not 
because it is innate. It appears everywhere because it is a nearly inevitable consequence of other 
capacities”. In other words, moral sentiments are acquired through sufficient moral education 
in a culture, but may vary in different cultures. 
There are three main aspect emphasizes by Prinz in what concerns the role that culture 
plays in morality. The first one is that culture is the cause of morality, since that in his view all 
moral values came from a culture. A second aspect is that culture ends up being an effect of 
morality. Notice that individuals who have acquired similar moral values in some culture are 
more inclined to cooperate with each other, maintaining the social structure for their culture. 
Last, but not the least, culture is the reason for the existence of morality. This can be understood 
in the sense that morality exists because it has served for cultures as maintenance system of its 
social relations. Namely, the moral behavior emerged as a necessity for making and 
maintaining a socio-cultural community stable.  
Prinz uses several studies in the field of psychology, biology and anthropology to 
sustain that emotions are related to how individuals realize moral distinctions. However, the 
central point of his thoughts on morality relies in the essential relationship between sentiments 
and moral judgments, where sentiment is a disposition to experience emotions under certain 
circumstances. Following the argumentation strategy proposed by Prinz, namely, use data from 
science to support a philosophical position, the problem in this case regards of what empirical 
data should be consulted in order to confirm this sort of relation. 
There are two main problems in Prinz’s approach. The first one consists that he can’t 
prove the presence of a non-manifest disposition, adding a metaphysical element to his theory. 
The second derives from the first, and is in the impossibility to empirically prove the presence 
of an essential relation between moral judgments and the non-manifested phenomena of 
culturally based sentiments, as opposed to a naturalistic explanation grounded in natural 
characteristics presents in social mammals. In this point, Prinz is just throwing away all the 
empirical data from evolutionary biology, ethology, experimental psychology and archeology 
that show a huge variety of social structure communities, which do not need complex artificial 
constructions for the individuals to maintain their social relations or their capacity to approve 
and censor social behaviors. 
 
3. Conclusion 
This article is indeed a small analysis of Prinz’s theory and it does not enter in all the small 
nuances of his proposal. However, I think it is sufficient to show that his alleged naturalism is 
just a traditional cultural based investigation of morality, disguised by the several experiments 
that he so hardly explain throughout his book. In this sense, his claims are a bit less original 
than his first works, such as The Emotional bases of Moral Judgments (2006), where he gives more 
credit to the natural disposition that inclines social mammals in engage into social behaviors. I 
grant that he seeks a new approach, but ends up with no radically new conclusions. 
The most disturbing problem in the moral psychology advocated by Prinz is that there 
are no real clues about the natural mechanisms that connects the emotional bases of morality 
and its actual functioning in social groups. In the end, there is no empirical evidence that can 
show how a moral rule is sentimentally stored and related to the basic emotions experienced by 
individuals. It is a fact that the basic emotions listed by Prinz are found in a great number of 
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cultures, but this do not establish cultural aspects as necessary for the operation and emergence 
of these empirically identifiable social rules. 
There is no way to know that the compliance between emotions and moral norms are 
linked in the way that Prinz claims to be, and not rather by other and more natural 
characteristics. Without a new evolutionist genealogy that explains the basic emotional ground 
underlying the moral norms, the constructive part of the naturalistic approach remains 
unfinished. In what concerns morality, Prinz fails in this task once that the objectivity awarded 
by him is nothing more than a position of a metaphysical culture based principle, rather than a 
factual and causal explanation of the emergence and development of this mechanism in the 
world. 
 
References 
PRINZ, J. Furnishing the mind: concepts and their perceptual basis. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. 
PRINZ, J. Gut reactions: a perceptual theory of emotion. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
PRINZ, J. The emotional basis of moral judgments. Philosophical Explorations, v. 9, n. 1, p. 29-43, 
2006. 
PRINZ, J. The emotional construction of morals. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
PRINZ, J. Is morality innate? In: SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W. (Ed.) Moral Psychology. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 01-34. 
 
